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The transformation of the system of industrial relations in
unionized settings in the U.S. that has occurred in this decade
has led to a rethinking of the basic paradigm used to understand
labor relations. The arguments presented below outline the
challenges to that paradigm and the role that strategic decisions
play in explaining recent events in the U.S. Finally, these
arguments are used to examine recent efforts to alter one of the
key elements in labor costs; workrules.
The Challenge of Recent Events in the U.S.
Changing product markets, new management strategies, and the
decline of the labor movement have generated tremendous pressures
for change in the U.S. system of industrial relations. That
system had remained reasonably unchanged from its creation in the
1930's through the 1970's. Beginning with the 1970's, however,
market pressures associated with rising foreign and nonunion
domestic competition joined with market deregulation in many
industries to put great pressure on established prices and, in
turn, on labor costs. These pressures were accentuated by the
1980 recession, the steepest since the 1930's, which drove many
high-cost producers out of business. One consequence was that a
disproportionate number of unionized operations closed as their
costs tended to be higher. Further, the reversal of union
contractual gains known generally as concession bargaining became
a routine practice. Foreign and nonunion competition explain
more than half of the distribution of concession bargaining
(Cappelli 1983). Recent figures from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics suggest that virtually all union members may have made
concessions to reduce labor costs.
The changes in the system of U.S. industrial relations that
became noticeable with the 1980 recession were so severe,
however, that they could not be adequately explained simply by
changes in markets or in the environment generally. For example,
the decline in union membership (from approximately 23 percent to
estimates as low as 18 percent of the labor force at present) was
far sharper than could be explained simply by the unemployment
associated with the recession. Farber (1984), Freeman (1984),
and Dickens and Leonard (1985) find, for example, that changes in
1. Labor costs tended to be above average in part because of the
growth of low-cost competition which pulled the average down. In
addition, unionized operations tended to be concentrated in
manufacturing and other industries more vulnerable to entry; they
also tend to be older and less competitive in their capital
structure (Kochan and Verma 1983).
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the economy account for only a fraction (roughly one-third) of
the decline in unionization in the U.S. These conclusions were
supported in the mid-1980's when union membership and coverage
continued to decline even as the economy improved; this would
appear to be the first time in the modern period when U.S. unions
have failed to make gains during an economic expansion.
Similarly, not all of the concession bargaining is explained
by market forces. Many concession negotiations took place in
operations that were healthy. Further, concession bargaining
continues even as the economy improves. Indeed, recent research
suggests that the basic structure of wage equations has shifted;
wages are now lower than in the past given similar levels of
unemployment, inflation, and other macroeconomic variables
(Farber?). In addition, there is now considerably more variance
in labor relations practices even where the same basic
environmental factors apply; bargaining is decentralized --
pattern bargaining across employers and across locations for the
same employer has diminished -- and bargaining outcomes now vary
widely even within the same firm.
These and other changes in U.S. industrial relations
suggested that traditional explanations, which focused on
pressures from the social and economic environment and allowed no
independent role for the parties, are no longer adequate for
explaining recent developments. Additional arguments have been
needed, for example, to allow a role for factors unique to the
firm and its collective bargaining relationship with labor.
Kochan and Verma (1983), for example, found early evidence for
this by documenting that the decline of unionization was
particularly sharp within the firm; unionized facilities declined
while nonunion plants grew.
These arguments have led to a new framework for considering
changes in labor relations (Kochan, McKersie, and Cappelli
1984). That framework has added two notions to the
environmentally based, systems explanation of changes in
industrial relations. First, both unions and management in many
situations have discretion over decisions because the
environmental pressures are not strong enough, at least in the
short run, to dictate the outcomes. Some of these decisions may
be unilateral, such as the choice of plant location by management
or the selection of targets for representational elections by
unions. These decisions are presumably based in part on internal
strategies for labor relations that the parties want to pursue --
hence the term "strategic choices."
2. A Business Week survey, for example, found that 11 percent of
employers were seeking concessions even though they were not
justified by current economic circumstances.
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Second, these decisions and the effects that they have on
industrial relations operate not only through collective
bargaining but at other levels as well. Unilateral decisions
such as those associated with business planning decisions operate
at a level above collective bargaining -- referred to here as the
corporate or organizational level. For example, a decision to
shift production capacity to nonunion shops clearly has an
important impact on labor relations but is made outside of
collective bargaining. Other decisions and effects operate at a
level below collective bargaining through shopfloor relations.
For example, the quality of relations at the shopfloor often
varies widely across locations covered by the same collective
bargaining agreements because of special programs and practices
introduced at that level.
Recent research has found empirical support for this
framework that helps to explain some of the recent developments
in labor relations noted above. This is especially true for the
relationship between management business decisions at the
organization level and collective bargaining outcomes. Kochan,
McKersie, and Cappelli (1984) find that business decisions in the
rubber industry explained the variance in negotiating positions
across firms and, in turn, helped explain differences in
bargaining outcomes. Cappelli (1985) argues that the mechanism
through which business decisions affect bargaining and outcomes
is through their effect on labor demand; differences in
contractual changes across airlines following deregulation are
explained in this fashion. Cappelli and Chalykoff (1986) use
survey data to show that firms pursuing union avoidance as an
overall strategy open many more plants and are much more
successful at keeping unions out of those plants than are firms
that attach more importance to securing gains in collective
bargaining; Kochan, McKersie and Chalykoff (1986) find that union
avoidance firms have reduced unionized employment significantly
more than have firms that did not emphasize this strategy.
Chalykoff (1986) finds that such firm& also have secured smaller
settlements in collective bargaining.
3. Some of the separation of issues by level is the result of
U.S. labor laws which create a category of issues that are
mandatory topics for collective bargaining (wages and conditions)
and a category of permissive topics (including business decisions
like plant locations) which are part of bargaining only if both
sides agree. See U.S. Congress (1983) for these and other labor
law problems.
4. Our views on the role of strategy in industrial relations were
formed independently of the British literature which emerged
roughly at the same time. Certainly there are similarities;
especially the notion that many current developments are driven
from the management side not simply as reactions to environmental
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Employer Options in the Unionized Sector
Asset Management Versus Value Added Management
The arguments and research outlined above suggest that the most
important factor changing the system of industrial relations in
the U.S. is the strategies and decisions pursued by management in
response to a changing environment. Firms have responded to
cost-cutting pressures with a variety of strategies, all of which
have implications for industrial relations. One set of
strategies might be called "asset management" -- shifting the
firm's capital away from current employees and their work
systems, typically union systems. The most extreme case would be
simply to sell all or parts of the business and transfer the
firm's assets to another line of business. Some firms may alter
their product lines and emphasize market niches where union labor
costs are less of a burden.
For those who stay in the business, other strategies include
opening nonunion facilities and transfering work to existing
ones. These options have become easier in recent years, and the
evidence cited above suggests that they are common and effective
strategies. A related option is to subcontract parts of
operations. In some situations, investment in new technology,
such as CAD/CAM equipment, can be used to reduce labor and, in
turn, labor costs.
Asset management strategies bypass current work
arrangements, generally eliminating unions and unionized jobs,
but avoid efforts to address and redesign existing industrial
relations. Some firms, however, have pursued a different
strategy; the reduction of labor costs through reform of the
existing work systems, what we refer to as "value added" or
productivity enhancing management. It is interesting to ask why
some firms pursue value added strategies while others do not.
changes but as conscious management strategies. The
categorization by Thurly and Wood (1983) of labor strategies
according to product market characteristics may be closest to our
own work. In general, however, the British literature appears to
be more focused on management strategies in collective bargaining
(e.g., Purcell and Sisson (1983). It may also be fair to say
that our arguments have been more closely associated with market
forces while much of the British literature seems more closely
aligned with behavioral arguments.
5. For example, some trucking firms have abandoned the "full
load" or point-to-point business for the "less than full load"
market, which requires transfering loads, etc. and terminal
operations, because low-wage, nonunion competition is fierce in
the former.
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Certainly one reason is that not all firms find it equally easy
to pursue other options. For example, the labor law governing
air transport makes t more difficult for carriers to establish
nonunion operations. This is one reason why airlines have been
particularly concerned with reforming workrules.
There may be other reasons, however. The rise in the cost
of capital in recent years has made it relatively more expensive
to build new facilities, which begin nonunion, than to revamp
existing plants, which are often unionized. Where firms have a
great deal of capital tied up in unionized plants, it is more
difficult to shift those operations elsewhere. Further, some
firms are finding that the experience and high skill level of
their unionized workforces is well suited to the frequent changes
in product lines and the often idiosyncratic, batch production
required for tailoring output t narrow and changing market
niches (Piori and Sabel, 1985). Employers in general may be
finding it more efficient now to pursue a policy of reforming
current practices in part because it is easier to secure such
changes-from unions as their power declines and their concern for
aiding individual employers (in an effort to save jobs)
increases.
The Issue of Workrules
For firms that try to cut labor costs at existing
operations, the most important avenue now is to alter workrules
through job redesign. During the height of the recession,
managements efforts were directed toward wage cuts. Wage and
benefit cuts generate immediate cost savings and were useful for
meeting immediate, cashflow crises; workrule changes were less
attractive as they generated no immediate savings since at
current manning levels would cut average costs would drop only if
output expanded.
There are limits to how much wages in particular can be cut,
however, and this soon increased the importance of workrule
changes as a way of cutting costs. From the employee side,
workrule changes were typically a more acceptable way to reduce
6. The Railway Labor Act, which governs air transport,
establishes bargaining units across the entire airline system
making it impossible to set up nonunion stations; airlines have
established separate, nonunion subsidiaries, although the
legality of these arrangements has not been settled clearly
(Cappelli 1986).
7. Our case studies of manufacturing firms find management
arguing, for example, that new product lines can often be
introduced faster in unionized plants because the workforce has
more experience working the "bugs" out of new lines.
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labor costs than are wage cuts. Cappelli (1983) finds a
cost-cutting heirarchy with workers most sensitive and resistant
to wage changes, then benefits cuts, followed by workrule
changes. Workrule changes not only are less visible and
therefore have less symbolic importance for unions but also do
not affect one's standard of living. (The potential effects on
employment obviously are important and are considered below.)
Wage cuts also suffer from diminshing returns from the management
side. As Slichter (cite?) noted, reductions in compensation
have a quick and negative effect on morale that in turn affects
productivity through a variety of channels such as absenteeism,
turnover, etc.
In addition, pressures soon mount to restore wage and
benefit cuts when periods of crisis pass; in contrast, workrule
changes, especially those associated with a systematic redesign
of jobs, tend to become permanent as it is more difficult to
revert to the older system. Finally, workrule changes have
become a crucial source of comparative cost advantage because
they cannot easily be identified and copied by competitors, in
part because of the idiosyncracies of organizations and jobs.
This is in contrast to wage concessions which are well publicized
and have spread quickly across competitors -- a kind of
employer-driven pattern bargaining. These factors and the
interest they generated in changing workrules became more
important as recession-based crises gave way to regovery and
longer-run concerns of competitiveness and growth.
Describing the System of Workrules
8. Of course, this is not the first time that job redesign has
been a concern in the U.S. The Western Electric experiments of
the 1930's and then the quality of worklife movement in the
1970's (symbolized by the Work in America (1973) report, much
like On the Quality of Working Lffe (1973) in Britain), shifted
attention-Trom traditional, industrial engineered approaches to
work organization by arguing that much of the unrest in the
workplace, the poor quality of products, and the lack of growth
in productivity, existed because jobs did not meet the needs of
the new generation of workers. This motivation faded as the
economy dropped into the recessions of the 1970's (Marglin 1979)
and was replaced by the current employer-driven concern with
cutting labor costs, mainly by shedding labor. In many cases,
factors other than cost-cutting efforts also played a role. For
example, the introduction of new technology, especially CAD/CAM
techniques, provided an independent pressure to restructure
jobs. We focus on the more common cases where cost reduction is
the motivation, however.
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The traditional system of workrules was established by
collective bargaining and subsequently transfered to the nonunion
sector. A taxonomy for organizing workrules is presented below
and is used to describe the traditional system of workrules as
well as recent innovations in that system:
1. Horizontal structure -- which tasks are-assigned to a
given job, typically set out in job descriptions. Piori points
out that narrow job descriptions were first introduced as an
extension of Scientific Management. Unions defended them not
only to keep workloads down on individual jobs but to maintain
employment. Because the tasks associated with any operation were
divided between workers, it was difficult to lay anyone off
without disrupting the flow of work. The demarcations between
jobs were especially sharp and narrow where different jobs were
represented by different unions as in construction; if tasks were
not kept separate, work might end up flowing from one union to
the other. The narrowness of jobs was also fostered by
management's reaction to seniority-based rules for promotions and
layoffs. This criterion meant that jobs were not always filled
by those with the necessary abilities; narrowing jobs made them
simple enough for even minimally qualified workers to handle.
Changes in the horizontal structure amount to broadening the
tasks that given workers can be assigned as well as the
circumstances under which they can be assigned them. Broader job
descriptions are explicitly designed to reduce the number of
workers needed for a particular operation by eliminating idle
time when a particular set of tasks might not need to be done.
These efforts work best where jobs are closely interrelated --
where tasks are done in the same area but at different times --
such as maintenance work, continuous production technologies, and
craft work generally. A good example of a change in the
horizontal job structure would be the introduction of utility
craftsmen, especially in maintenance functions, who perform
routine carpentry, electrical work, and plumbing tasks. GM, for
example, has reduced the number of craft classifications from 20
to 3 at the refurbished NUMMI plant in Freemont. Some new
airlines like People Express routinely cross skill lines to meet
unusual work demands; pilots help load bagslwhere the need
arrises, management will sell tickets, etc. People's claims,
for example, never to have hired a single person soley to do
9. Freeman and Medoff (1985 Chapter 10) and Foulkes (1983) point
out that union gains have been passed on to nonunion workers to
reduce the incentive for unionization as well as to standardize
procedures within firms that are partly unionized.
10. Of course, this crossing of craft lines can only move
downward toward lower skill positions; baggage handlers do not
fly planes yet.
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administrative work (Parenti 1983).
Horizontal broadening of jobs is thought to be more
difficult to achieve in production operations, especially
assembly lines, where specific tasks occupy workers more or less
continually. Yet there may still be gains in such cases from
substitutions for absent workers, temporary reallocation of
workers where operations run at varying capacities, etc. GM's
Delco-Remy plant recently cut its assembly job classifications
from 75 to one; such changes are wide-spread and in firms as
diverse as Digital Equipment, Best Foods (mayonnaise plant),
Proctor and Gamble, and Rawlings Sporting Goods (baseball
gloves). Such changes are especially difficult, though, where
current job classifications span different unions because the
elimination of a job classification may eliminate an entire
union; Kahn (1971) notes, for example, how technological change
on the flight deck gradually eliminated jobs such as navigators,
radio operators, flight engineers and their individual unions
(generating considerable inter-union conflict in the process) as
their functions were combined with those of pilots. Changes are
in the works even where jobs span different unions, however.
Holloywood's screen unions, for example, have recently agreed to
permit greater operating flexibility across their juristictions
(12).
One important concern about broadening jobs is that craft
workers in particular are pushed away from jobs that have clearly
identifiable external labor markets (e.g., electrician, plumber)
and toward jobs that involve a combination of skills that are
relatively unique to individual firms. In short, workers are
pushed out of external labor markets and toward internal labor
markets. For workers, this may be a risky strategy as it reduces
their opportunities and makes them dependent on their employer.
For employers, shifting these workers to the internal labor
market also makes the firm more dependent on the individuals
currently in those jobs. Both parties become more dependent on
each other, but which side gains relatively in power depends on
how bargaining power was allocated previously by the external
market. Craft workers, who had power because of strong external
markets, probably lose relatively; semi-and unskilled workers who
lack strong external markets may gain power from the shift to the
internal market.
2. Vertical structure -- the hierarchy and authority
structure governing work. Typical arrangements gave foremen and
supervisors complete control over decisions about work within the
confines of the labor agreement. In addition, hierarchies of
authority were established within the production workforce,
especially in craft work -- e.g., apprentice, journeyman,
craftsman. Some arrangements specified the number of apprentices
assigned to work under a journeyman and required supervision of
given projects by craftsmen. These arrangements prevented
lower-paid junior workers from displacing senior workers and also
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provide less taxing jobs for the latter. They helped stabilize
unions and gave them some control over the skills being used.
Changes in the vertical structure of jobs take two forms.
The first occurs within a heirarchy of jobs and consists of
transfering tasks to lower skilled, lower paid workers. In air
transport, for example, the task of straightening-up the cabin
between flights is being transfered from flight attendants to
lower paid cabin cleaners; the job of "pushing back" planes,
walking with them from the gate to the runway, is being shifted
from mechanics to lower-paid members of the ground crew.
Plumbers and pipefitters unions have agreed with the Mechanical
Contractors Association to add a semi-skilled grade below
journeyman to take over many of the simpler tasks formerly done
by journeymen (DLR 6/17/85). Cummins engine has created a new
work category of technician to take over some of the routine
tasks from engineers.
The second, more common, effort to change the vertical job
structure occur within production work and are efforts to
transfer some managerial authority to workers. These programs
include quality of worklife plans, autonomous workgroups, etc.
and vary in the authority given to the workers. One argument for
these arrangements is that they shorten communications lines,
especially on questions of scheduling and crdinating tasks, and
make for quicker, more effective decisions. The more important
argument is that participation per se may enrich the job 1 2
increase satisfaction and, in turn, mprove performance.
The amount of decisionmaking pushed down to the workgroup
varies across operations. The most common arrangements give the
group control over decisions otherwise made by immediate
supervisors as at GM's Fiero and Delco-Remy plants. Workgroups
at Xerox's wireharness division and Martin-Marietta's Denver
plant go further and get help make technical and production
decisions (Thomson 1982). Some like TRW's Lawrence, KA plant and
Digital Equipment's Enfield, CT facility even make personnel
decisions about hiring, training, and production standards for
11. On the other hand, some argue that the process of worker
decisionmaking is generally by concensus and may be extremely
prolonged; any net benefits in this area are certainly offset
when employees simply participate in management decisionmaking.
12. As Fox (1985) notes, this process of building a "moral
commitment" to work is a much more complicated relationship than
other cost-cutting measures. Kochan, Katz, and Gobielle (1984)
provide evidence that productivity at GM was higher where QWL
performance is better, but many reseachers are remain unconvinced
about the relationship between QWL programs and productivity
gains.
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the group (Personnel 1985, Industry Week, 1/21/85).
Workgroups also need to be -supported with the same kind of
technical advice and resources that management requires. These
groups may need more sensitive information (about business plans,
strategies, etc.) to function effectively than management might
traditionally feel comfortable giving them. Exempt employees may
resent "serving" production workers, especially in technical
areas, as Martin-Marietta found. Indeed, this problem is even
worse with general management -- especially supervisors -- who
are confused about their new role under QWL programs (Klein
1984).
3. Deployment -- how workers move through the organization
including rules governing hiring, promotion, transfers, layoffs,
and scheduling. Unions seek control over hiring to protect
against "free rider" problems, often securing it through closed
shop agreements. Employers have in general only recently given
much attention to sophisticated selection procedures and
typically used-cheap screening systems (e.g., high school
diploma) for hiring. Seniority typically governs promotions,
transfers, and layoffs because it is widely accepted as a fair
and objective criterion, it provides increasing job security for
older, less mobile workers, and it is simple to administer. One
complication of seniority systems is that they permit "bumping"
-- the systematic replacement of junior workers by more senior
ones down through the organization when, for example, a position
is eliminated.
Union efforts to reduce layoffs extend beyond seniority
systems and typically include income security programs (e.g.,
supplemental unemployment insurance) which create financial
incentives for the employer to avoid layoffs by raising the fixed
costs of labor. Similar arrangements govern the scheduling of
work by establishing premium pay for working undesirable shifts
and overtime.
Deployment rules also cover whether employees are full time
(with at least some implied commitment by the firm to employment
security) or are temporary/part-time workers. Part-time and
temporary work shifts jobs and employment risks to the external
labor market; indeed, some firms use temporary and part-time
workers to help reduce employment fluctuations for their "core"
workers (see below).
Changes in the rules governing the deployment of workers may
be less difficult to implement than changes in the structure of
work and bring more immediate relief than many other workrule
changes. Changes have been instituted first in the rules
governing selection into jobs, in part because of the increased
demands that new job designs place on workers. Companies like
Rohm and Haas now use elaborate testing and screening systems to
select workers for their team-based plants (WSJ 4/16/85). GM and
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the UAW compromised on a system that would select workers for its
NUMMI facility based not only on seniority (those laid-off from
.- · ·the Freemont plant)-but also on the results of an assessment
program jointly administered by GM and the UAW. Cablec company
now makes skill levels as important a criterion as seniority in
rehiring decisions (WSJ 6/4/86).
The most important change in deployment rules for management
may be efforts to reduce the role played by seniority, especially
the effects of "bumping" -- seniority-based reassignments
typically following layoffs. Especially where jobs are
specialized, management argues that transfers and promotions
based soley on seniority often mean that unqualified people end
up with the jobs; bumping is even worse because it shifts workers
out of current jobs, disrupting workgroups and often requiring
vast amounts of retraining. Xerox recently secured limits on the
extent of bumping in return for a no-layoff clause; Cablec
company now uses skill level as a criterion equal in importance
to seniority in rehiring decisions. The UAW offered to reduce
the role of seniority for intraplant transfers at Mack Truck
(60).
A second set of deployment changes deal with work
schedules. Recent retooling of many manufacturing facilities has
sharply increased the amount of capital equipment, and management
has argued for more work shifts to amortize this investment.
High-tech manufacturing, for example, regularly works 12 hour
shifts; the tire industry has pushed hard for adding regular
weekend shift work at its newer facilities. Along with these
schedule changes have been management demands to reduce or
eliminate premium pay for shift pay, etc. that provides an
impediment to these changes. The United Transport Union, for
example, recently agreed to eliminate many of these premium
payments in the railroad industry (DLR 1/30/86).
Changes in deployment rules are also being used to address
fluctuations in production. The major airlines have rapidly
followed American in hiring part-time workers (at lower rates of
pay and benefits) to staff less busy airports; the Saturn
agreement creates a second category of employee without the job
security enjoyed by the primary group (employment fluctuations
for the second group help provide job protection for the first
group) (WSJ 7/10/85). The Newspaper Writer's Guild and the
Associated Press recently reached an agreement to let employees
share jobs, in part as a way of dealing with job losses (77).
4. Production Standards -- intensity of effort and manning
levels for idiosyncratic jobs. These standards include crew
size, effort levels, and work pace. They have been described as
constituting the "effort bargain." They must strike a balance
between the employer's interest in maximizing output and the
employee's concern about being overworked. Production standards
are closely tied to compensation rules, especially where systems
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like measured day work are used, and are spelled out in union
contracts. Such standards often effectively become ceilings.
Changes in these standards have the clearest and most direct
benefit for management. It seems fair to say that most firms
have tightened standards in some way -- stricter quality control,
higher output levels, tighter personnel policies (e.g.,
absenteeism), etc. In some cases, these new standards stem from
changes in other workrules, such as changes in the horizontal
structure of jobs, and may be different without necessarily being
harder for workers; in other cases, the standards are not the
result of other job changes but are a kind of "speed up" that may
make jobs harder for workers. The United Parcel Service (UPS)
company, for example, has focused its labor cost reduction
efforts largely on tightening production standards for workers.
UPS organizes work in a traditional, time and motion fashion (it
employs about 1000 industrial engineers) and is continually
fying to lower the time required to perform individual tasks.
Workers in general are likely to resist tighter standards to
the extent that they raise output per worker because these
workrule changes are most obviously associated with job loss.
There has also been a general tightening of personnel
standards covering issues such as absenteeism and employee
misconduct. Many of these efforts fall under the heading of
"positive discipline"(20), a policy of immediate and progressive
penalties for employee misconduct. Such programs inevitably
foster resistance; workers recently struck General Electric'
newly redesigned plant in Lynn, MA in part over the handling of
shopfloor standards (84).
5. Compensation -- the amount and type of compensation and
the terms on which it is received. Most compensation systems in
the U.S. attach pay rates to jobs, rather than to individuals;
trade unions have encouraged this development with their interest
in standardizing wages across workers and taking wages out of
competition across competitors. As Lawler (1984) points out,
even where employers have explicit performance appraisal
programs, they generally breakdown because of the internal
political difficulties associated with differentially rewarding
workers.
Concession bargaining has obviously reduced wage premiums at
unionized firms, and no doubt management will try to reduce wages
down to market levels. Two-tier wage plans may be the most
obvious long-term attempt to get wages down to market rates.
13. (WSJ. It is important to note, however, that UPS also pays
high wages, has historically had supportive relations with its
union (Teamsters), and is generally seen to be an excellent
employer.
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Beyond that, however, the most important changes are those
designed to impart greater flexibility to wage costs so that they
vary with fortunes of the firm -- increasing in good times and
decreasing in bad. Lump-sum payments fall into this category in
that they do not raise base wage costs for future periods.
Profit sharing, stock ownership, and other forms of
performance-based pay not only impart flexibility but also ~ty to
tie the worker's financial incentives to those of the firm.
The problem in principle with many of these plans is that they
establish clearly that pay should be cut in downturns but are not
nearly so clear about what happens in upturns -- what constitutes
an upturn and how much should pay rise?
Beside the concern with flexibility, the other general
trends in compensation rules are designed to reinforce the
workrule changes outlined above. The most general of these are
efforts to abolish across-the-board pay increases for systems of
performance appraisal that will set pay increases for each
individual worker based past performance. There are two basic
problems with this-approach. First, it becomes incredibly
complicated to perform job evlauations on all these positions to
identify what the tasks are, to set standards for each job
(especially where the job changes), and then to evaluate the
performance of each individual. Second, as Foulkes (1983) notes,
systems of performance appraisal tend to break down in practice
even in nonunion firms because of the political difficulties they
raise (charges of subjectivity, etc.).
Perhaps the most important point about the traditional
system is that it worked. It provided an orderly, if not always
optimal, allocation of labor and provided some protection for
workers against capricious management decisions. As Kochan and
Cappelli (1983) argue, these rules bought labor peace in
unionized situations at the cost of some efficiency. For
management in the 1980's, the benefits of these arrangements were
apparently no longer worth the costs.
Revising Workrules
Employers in unionized firms have varied considerably in
their ftility to revise the system of workrules outlined
above. Some of the factors that affect the ability to change
workrules are outside of the control of the parties (e.g.,
14. Sockell (1985) finds that such plans do not necessarily have
this effect on workers; one study finds that many stock ownership
plans actually give employees nothing of value (4).
15. Nonunion employers obviously have more power to revise
workrules, but resistance to change within these firms may also
be severe. See McKersie and Klein ( ).
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available technology); others lie with the employees (e.g., the
strength and expertice of their unions). But many of the
important factors governing the ability to change workrules are
within management's influence and can be influenced by conscious
management strategies. The arguments below describe some of
these factors which explain the variance in workrule changes
across firms.
Proposition 1: Business Strategies and Employment Security
The process of negotiating labor cost reductions through changes
in the collective bargaining agreement is known as concession
bargaining and is driven on the worker's side by an interest in
reducing expected employment losses. The threat of job loss
certainly appears to drive concession bargaining, and while the
pressures of competitive product markets are typically behind
that threat, employers' business strategies have been very
important in creating such pressures. These strategies sharpen
the wage/employment trade-off for unions through (as noted above)
decisions about-outsourcing, plant closings, allocation of work
across locations, etc. The sharper the trade-off between
employment and labor costs, the more likely are unions to grant
concessions.
But securing workrule changes is quite a different process
from securing wage cuts precisely because of the employment
issue. Wage cuts reduce labor costs immediately and encourage
the hiring of labor; workrule changes reduce labor costs at
current output levels only if there are layoffs. Lessons from
productivity bargaining (McKersie and Hunter 1971) remind us that
workgroups are only interested in changing workrules if there is
some assurance that the changes will not result in layoffs. The
promise of job security requires a business strategy that is
consistent -- typically a plan for business expansion such as
taking back functions previously subcontracted. We found in the
U.S. airline industry, for example, that extensive workrule
changes were secured through negotiations only at carriers who
could offer prospects for growth and employment security,
contingent on workrule changes; carriers that could not offer
such a strategy could not change workrules as readily even if
severe employment losses were threatened (Cappelli 1985).
Proposition 2: The Role of Institutional Security
In addition to job security, acceptance of the union and its
role within the firm is certainly necessary to secure its
cooperation in any area, especially workrule changes. Unions
obviously find it difficult to work cooperatively on one level of
their relationship with the firm when management is threatening
the union at another level. For example, General Motors could
not get the UAW to consider work redesign efforts in the 1970's
while it was pursuing its Southern Strategy of opening nonunion
plants in the south. The complete redesign of traditional
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workrules at GM's new Saturn plant, in contrast, represents a
complete reversal of this situation; the UAW was actively
involved in the job redesign process at Saturn in large part
because GM agreed to have the UAW represent Saturn's employees
before the plant was built.
Some companies know that they either do not have the
resources or the strategies for the future that would facilitate
jointly planned change but want new workrules badly enough to
force them on their unions. Implementing changes through
confrontation and within the framework of labor law involves the
following steps: 1. insist on changes at the bargaining table 2.
if no agreement is reached at the strike deadline, continue to
operate the facility in the face of a strike 3. unilaterally
impose the changes presented in management's last offer.
Observers believe that management forced a recent strike at Santa
Fe Railroad in order to force workrule changes there (WSJ?); a
paper company we studied eliminated many job classifications and
imposed a pay-for-knowledge system on its workforce when they
-returned after losing a strike; Texas Air used the protections of
bankruptcy law after a strike was called to impose unilateral
changes in its labor contracts (Cappelli 1986).
In general, the quality of the collective bargaining
relationship, especially the amount of trust that the union has
in management, clearly affects whether unions can be convinced
that the firm will adhere to its business strategy and maintain
employment. In this sense, trust plays an intervening role in
determining whether workrules can be changed. The amount of
trust is in large part a function not only of the circumstances
but also of the style of leadership pursued by both management
and labor (See Purcell and Gray (1986) for arguments about
management style).
Proposition 3: The Need for An Internal Model
The introduction and administration of a new system of workrules
within an firm is a complex and idiosyncratic process that
typically requires a range of expertice and resources. Firms are
best able to manage the transition to a new system when they have
a model of alternative workrule arrangements within the
organization where many of these problems unique to the firm have
already been worked out. Such models were often came from
nonunion plants that were geographically isolated from the rest
of the production facilities. (The isolation reduces the
transfer of practices and employees from the older facilities.)
At General Motors, for example, many of the innovative work
designs currently being introduced in union plants were developed
first as experiments during the 1970's in their nonunion
facilities (Cherry 1982). GM's current cooperative enterprise
with Toyota in California (NUMMI) is designed in part to create a
new internal model -- based on Japanese practices -- for
manufacturing within GM. Many of the innovations in work design
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at Cummins Engine's main facilities in Columbus, IN were
perfected first at their innovative, nonunion plant in
Jamestown. TRW and Best Foods also recently transfered work
systems established at nonunion facilities to their unionized
plants (WSJ 4/16/85).
Internal models of innovative workrules can be developed
even within traditional facilities. In some cases, the
opportunity to develop a pilot project is created by the
introduction of new technology in a subset of the operation. In
other cases, such as railroads, subsidiaries or sheltered
operations have been developed that reduce crew sizes in an
effort to attract new business.
Casual observation seems to suggest that firms with an
internal model of innovative workrules are able to reorganize
work more quickly at their more traditional operations; firms
like Cummins Engine, Goodyear, and others fit this category. It
is not clear, however, whether in all these cases the innovative,
-nonunion model was established to help transfer workrule lessons
to the rest of the firm, as at GM, or simply to enhance
productivity at that plant. In all cases, the presense of the
alternative model also serves as a threat to both workers and
management at traditional operations; there is a competing model
within the organization that may take scarce resources and jobs
away from traditional facilities unless their productivity
rises. Such a threat is effective even within firms that are
otherwise sheltered from competition.
But the presense of an internal model and indeed the
knowledge of how that model should be implemented of course do
not guarantee successful workrule changes. For example, People
Express is generally thought to have a system of workrules that
is a model of flexibility and comparative advantage for
management, yet it has had tremendous difficulties trying to
impose some of this system on Frontier which it recently
purchased even though the tasks to be performed are identical at
Frontier. (74) The difficulties of meshing these two systems
were so severe that they helped push People to offer Frontier for
sale.
Proposition 4: The Power of a Changed Context
Strategic decisions at the business level also play an important
role in managing the expectations created by workrule changes.
Certainly many of the decisions that create pressure for
concession bargaining also make the transitions in workrules
easier to take; the threat of layoffs, for example, certainly
lowers expectations and creates interest in workrule changes.
Beyond that, however, workrule innovations are easier to affect
where existing patterns of custom and practice on the shopfloor
are broken. Perhaps the most effective way to do this is to get
rid of the old facilities and rearrange the existing workforces.
- 16 -
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Firms have had the greatest success introducing innovations when
facilities are new, before informal practices are established and
acquire normative force. (Lake Orion example of job transfers.)
More effective arrangements are those where firms have the
resources to establish new plants, as with GM's Saturn facility,
or where they can make retooling decisions coincide with workrule
changes so that existing facilities are essentially rebuilt.
TRW, for example, started a new facility in Lawrence, KA and
staffed it with recent high school graduates who had no prior
experiences against which to make invidious comparisons (Engle
1985).
Proposition 5: Fitting Changes into a System
Finally and perhaps most importantly, whether workrule changes
will be effective depends on whether they can be fit together
into effective system. Not all workrule changes are equally
difficult to introduce. Those that involve horizontal and
vertical changes -- what Walton (1985) calls the "High
Commitment" work system -- require systematic changes in other
workrules to support the new work system. There is an internal
order to the workrule arrangements outlined above, and whether a
change can be successfully introduced depends on what other
workrules are in effect at the shopfloor. The following chart
illustrates how changes in specific workrules drive changes in
related rules:
Initial Workrule Change
Horizontal/ Vertical/ Deployment/ Standards/ Comp.
Resulting
Change
Horizontal
Vertical X X
Deployment X X
Standards X X X
Compensation X X X X
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Horizontal changes are the most difficult to affect because
they must be supported by changes in all other rules;
compensation, in contrast, is the area most affected by other
workrule changes. Every other workrule change may need to be
supported by changes in compensation. The arguments below
illustrate the kinds of changes in related workrules that are
driven by a change in any one category of rules.
The broadening of jobs first creates a need for changes in
vertical worrules. The greater flexibility that broader jobs
give management makes the process of supervision much more
complicated. Indeed, traditional forms of supervision where
management tells workers which tasks to perform when may have to
be abandoned in favor of systems where workers have considerable
autonomy in work decisions. Second, deployment rules may need to
change because different kinds of workers may be needed to fit
these broader jobs -- e.g., workers with a wider range of skills
and the capacity to learn new ones -- and new methods of
selection may be needed to find them. The Borg-Warner company
-calculates, for-example, that it takes ten times as much training
for these broader production jobs than for the positions they
replace (WSJ 6/4/86). In addition, greater flexibility in work
schedules may be needed to take advantage of these broader
skills.
Production standards also must change with broader jobs,
focusing less on individual tasks and more on overall performance
measures as the tasks associated with particular jobs become
harder to define. These changes, in turn, force revisions in
compensation systems. For example, when the content of the job
is changing almost from day-to-day, and workers in the same
classification may be doing quite different tasks, how can the
usual wage/effort bargain be maintained? One answer might be to
put production workers on salaries. Second, compensation must
provide incentives for workers to acquire the additional skills
and knowledge needed for these jobs. Such skill-based or
pay-for-knowledge systems reward the acquisition of skills rather
than the tasks performed. At GM, for example, craft workers earn
me additional 20 cents an hour for each three new tasks learned.
Virtually all employers trying to broaden craft and technical
jobs have introduced similar plans (although they are still rare
16. It is debatable whether adding more tasks to a job
necessarily enriches it, meets worker needs, and provides
nonpecuniary incentives to take on these broader jobs. Unless
the additional tasks are interesting, such incentives are not
created (see Hackman and Oldham, 1975).
17. Proctor and Gamble was one of the first to introduce these
plans. They are called skill evaluation plans there and were
introduced in the early 1970's.
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for production workers). The pay programs must be tightly
matched to manpower needs to prevent the acquisition of skills
that are not needed and, in turn, to worker frustration. Many of
these pay plans also run into the problem of "topping out" --
ceilings on skill payments end the incentives to learn new
skills.
In general, the greater flexibility associated with
expanding the horizontal job structure also creates greater
management discretion and the possibility of decisions that are
seen as unfair. Recent strikes at GM's Wentzville, MO and Lake
Orion, MI plants apparently were associated with resentment and
charges of favoritism about job assignments and pay for knowledge
increases, respectively. They may also alter bargaining power on
the shopfloor to the extent that skills and mixes of skills are
created that are idiosyncratic to the operation and are very
difficult to replace.
Vertical. One of the difficulties associated with changes
in the vertical structure of jobs is that it takes a workgroup
quite some time to begin to operate effectively as a team, and
deployment decisions that disrupt the team (schedule changes,
seniority-based layoffs and bumping, etc.) have to be avoided.
Guest (197?) found, for example, that layoff decisions severely
disrupted the QWL process at GM's Tarrytown plant. Just as
different selection procedures are needed to find employees to
fit broader jobs, they may also be needed to find workers who can
handle the greater autonomy associated with these systems.
Finally, production standards and the process of setting
them also must change when decisionmaking is pushed down the work
heirarchy. As with broader jobs, the standards certainly must
move from individuals to the workgroup. Where workers have more
authority and must set or monitor their own standards, problems
of compliance are raised. In particular, problems of collusion
similar to output restrictions or "goldbricking" may be common
where workgroups are asked to set their own standards. Another
difficult question is assigning responsibility for meeting
standards; to what extent is the group responsible? If their
responsibility has increased vis a vi management, perhaps
compensation ought to be rearranged to encourage higher standards
and should look more like management's -- performance bonuses,
incentive pay, etc. Otherwise, there are certainly limits to the
amount of responsibility workgoups will take on just for fun.
Deployment. Changes in deployment per se generally make
fewer demans on other workrules. Changes tat reduce the role
of seniority and increase the use of merit criteria in
promotions, layoffs, etc. make new demands on job standards as
they become the basis for many of these decisions. Similarly,
innovations in scheduling that make it easier to move workers
within the organization require modifications in traditional
compensation systems which typically create financial incentives
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to avoid flexible deployment (e.g., premium pay).
Standards. Tighter production standards raise conflicts
mainly with compensation rules. To the extent that changes in
standards are seen as making jobs harder, workers can be expected
to demand more pay and to suffer a decline in satisfaction if
they do not receive it. More importantly, changes in the
structure of compensation are necessary to reinforce changes in
standards -- encouraging higher levels of performance and the
taking on of risks, etc.
Compensation. Again, virtually all of the important
innovations in compensation currently underway are driven by
changes in other workrules. Many of the self-standing
compensation changes (e.g., making pay vary with the fortunes of
the firm) can be introduced without changes in other rules; some,
such as the introduction of performance-based pay, require clear
standards against which to judge performance.
Conclusions
The system of highly-specified workrules that developed
during the post-war period has begun to unravel not only because
of pressures from the market but also because of management
strategies that both force and encourage workrule innovations.
Management's interest in pursuing workrule changes and a value
added strategy varies across firms according to their
circumstances; their success in achieving changes also varies in
large part with their ability to address the issues outlined by
the propositions above.
The changes introduced in workrules generally seek to
eliminate artificial restraints on decisionmaking and allow more
flexibility in the use of labor. In a sense, the elimination of
these restraints makes labor relations and the decisions
governing it closer to a free market system. Certainly one
aspect of this is to place workers much more closely in
competition with each other: Wages and costs are no longer
uniform across competitors; the presence of "internal models"
within firms creates competition for jobs within the firm; the
use of performance appraisals, merit-based pay, and
individualized job standards creates competition between
individuals.
There is relatively little doubt that the emerging system of
innovative workrules will not leave workers better off. If costs
can be reduced, some jobs may be saved. But where the
competition is largely domestic, firms may find that they are
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simply cutting costs to take business away from each other.1 8
The new arrangements make it much more difficult for workers to
increase wages and capture some of the firm's profits because
wages are no longer taken out of competition across employers.
Indeed, changes such as higher production standards and more
variable compensation leave workers materially worse off in the
short run. These new workrules also give management much more
discretion and, in turn, create more opportunities for arbitrary
and capricious decisions.
Certainly some workers may gain from horizontal and vertical
workrule changes to the extent that they gain more autonomy and
variety from them. But the primary purpose of even these
workrule changes appears not to be to increase employee
satisfaction and capture any productivity gains that might
result; it is instead to reduce labor requirements. Indeed,
there is no doubt that the innovations in workrules are designed
to benefit management and that in many of these cases, it is the
weakness of trade unions that allows their adoption. Recent
changes in job classifications at AT+T and in flight attendant
work schedules at TWA, for example, were imposed after
unsuccessful strikes.
Flexibility in work decisions, however, does not inherently
benefit management. It simply aids whichever group at the moment
has the most bargaining power. In the 1940's and 1950's when
U.S. unions had great strength at the workplace, they would use
"flexibility" in work decisions to secure marginal improvements
across situations and "whipsaw" the employer by demanding equal
improvements across all situations. Management retreated behind
a consistent system of formal rules in order to reduce these
union gains. Accounts from the U.K. suggest that management is
at present trying to impose a system of formal rules, not unlike
that being abandoned in the U.S., to reduce the advantages that
unions had gained from informal negotiations. Ironically,
management in the U.S. may find that the more formal and
traditional system of workrules is in fact more efficient if
labor markets tighten, unions reorganize, and workers regain the
bargaining power that they have lost over the past decade.
18. For the industry as a whole, the effects of labor cost
reductions on employment are very indirect; the cuts have to be
big enough to lead to price reductions that combine with the
product's elasticity to increase demand (and employment) enough
to offset the cuts resulting from productivity gains. Certainly
the economy gains from productivity improvements, but it is not
so obvious that the economy as a whole gains from labor cost
reductions that result, for example, from lower wages.
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